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Abstract: This article discusses the internal situation of the Slovak Republic in the years 1994–1998, 
the period in which the country was governed by the coalition of Movement for Democratic Slovakia, 
the Slovak National Party and the Slovak Workers’ Association, and the prime minister was Vladimír 
Mečiar. The main objective of the research was to analyse the actions undertaken by the coalition gov-
ernment in the context of violations of civil and political rights and freedoms, which could indicate an 
authoritarian way of exercising power and the dismantling of a democratic state of law. In the analysed 
period, the role of the parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition was marginalised, the role of the 
media limited, the rights of national and ethnic minorities violated. There was also an ongoing, sharp 
conflict between Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and President Michál Kováč. The effect of this gov-
ernance was the union of almost all political forces and seizure of power after the elections in 1998. In 
order to answer the research questions, the author used the method of institutional and legal analysis, 
decision analysis and the statistical method. The research confirmed the hypothesis that, against the 
background of other Visegrad Group countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, in the case of 
Slovakia there were many instances of human rights violations in the period analysed. This led to the 
drastic deterioration of bilateral relations with many countries and the slowdown of Slovakia’s acces-
sion to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.
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Introduction
On 1 January 1993, a new state emerged on the political map of Europe, as a re-sult of the disintegration of the Czech and the Slovak Federal Republic: the Slo-
vak Republic. The purpose of this article is to present the internal situation in Slovakia 
1994–1998, namely the government of Vladimír Mečiar. The author tried to answer the 
question of to what extent the decisions taken by this government led to the dismantling 
of the democratic state of law and what consequences it had for the Slovak Republic in 
the international arena. The main hypothesis is that, compared to other countries of the 
Visegrad Group, in the case of Slovakia there were many instances of human rights vio-
lations and the result was a drastic deterioration of bilateral relations with the majority of 
states and slowdown in the process of accession to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) 
and the European Union (EU). The way power was exercised by the then coalition of 
the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovakian National Party (SNS) 
and the Union of Slovak Workers (ZRS) was referred to by Timothy Garton-Ash as 
a democrature (Garton-Ash, 2000, pp. 408–414), whereas Viatscheslau Avioutskii quot-
ed the words of the US Secretary of State Madelaine Albright, who described Slovakia 
as the “black hole of Europe” (Avioutskii, 2007, p. 21). In order to answer the research 
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questions and to verify the hypothesis assumed in the study, the institutional and legal 
method was applied, which allowed me to analyse legal acts. Decisional analysis was 
of great importance, as it allowed me to present the situations and processes that were 
the culmination of decisions taken by representatives of the then authorities. Statistical 
methods were used to analyse data referring to the results of parliamentary elections.
I. Parliamentary elections in 1994
The elections of 30 September and 1 October 1994 shaped the political scene of 
Slovakia for almost four years, a scene which was clearly polarised into a government 
coalition and a completely marginalised opposition. The Movement for Democratic Slo-
vakia won them once again, gaining similar support as two years earlier (35%). The 
anti-Meciar coalition proved too weak to compromise the position of HZDS. First and 
foremost, it was the animosities between the politicians of the Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Left Party (SDL) that determined the results 
(Parlamentné voľby 1994...; Żarna, 2015, p. 108).
Table 1
Results of parliamentary elections in 1994
Party Result(in %)
Number 
of seats
Movement for Democratic Slovakia 35.0 61
Common Choice 10.4 18
Hungarian Coalition 10.2 17
Christian Democratic Movement 10.1 17
Democratic Union of Slovakia 8.6 15
Association of Slovak Workers 7.3 13
Slovak National Party 5.4 9
Democratic Party 3.4 –
Communist Party of Slovakia 2.7 –
Christian Social Union 2.1 –
others 4.8 –
Together 100.0 150
Source: Parlamentné voľby 1994 on Slovensk, www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/par-
lamentne-volby/1994/vysledky, 29.07.2018.
The Movement for Democratic Slovakia this time stood for election in a coalition 
with the Slovak Agricultural Union (RSS), which was of little significance on the Slo-
vak political scene. The second place was taken by the coalition Common Choice (SV) 
formed by SDL, Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Rural Workers’ 
Movement (HPRS). The electoral results obtained by KDH, the Hungarian Coalition 
created by the Hungarian Citizens’ Party (MOS), the Hungarian Christian Democratic 
Movement (MKDH) and the Community (ESWS), as well as by the Democratic Union 
of Slovakia (DÚ) can be seen as confirmation of the stabilising position of these move-
ments and political parties. The results of the elections confirmed the dominant position 
PP 4 ’18 Towards authoritarianism. Internal situation in the Slovak republic... 105
of HZDS. In turn, the lack of a stable political structure was the result of ongoing divi-
sions on the political scene (Bajda, 2010a, pp. 78–83).
II. The government of Vladimír Mečiar
On 3–4 November 1994, an extraordinary parliamentary meeting was convened, 
during which the parliamentary majority centred around Vladimír Mečiar, while vot-
ing continuously for 23 hours, deprived the opposition of influence on the state. All 
parliamentary committees, television and radio supervisory boards, the Supreme Audit 
Office, the National Property Fund, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Special 
Service Inspection Commissions were filled with government supporters. This event has 
gone down in history as the “night of long knives.” In response, the European Union 
issued a démarche, expressing hope for the continuation of democratic reforms in Slo-
vakia (Jagodziński, 1994, p. 6). The creation of a new coalition government consisting 
of HZDS, SNS and ZRS with Mečiar as Prime Minister on 13 December 1994, was not 
without a significant impact on the entirety of socio-political life. In the electoral mani-
festo of 1994, HZDS highlighted the need for further strengthening of state sovereignty 
and economic development. The program also included declarations on membership of 
the EU and NATO.
In the context of relations with neighbours, the readiness to sign agreements, among 
others, with Hungary, was declared. Cooperation within international organisations, in-
cluding the UN, was to continue. In contacts with the Council of Europe, attention was 
paid to the need to respect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and 
ethnic groups. The importance of systemic transformation in the economic sphere, too, 
was emphasised, as well as the activation of diplomatic means in order to achieve stabi-
lisation in Central Europe (Košta, Greguš, 1996, p. 24).
In the case of the Slovak National Party, attention was paid to the priority of the 
national interests of the state, making membership of NATO and the EU dependent on 
the preservation of cultural diversity. The manifesto underlined the threats posed by the 
policy of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and, as a result, the 
threat of the loss of part of its territory. The unstable situation in Ukraine, or the inter-
nationalisation of the crisis in the Balkans was also a major concern. In connection with 
the possibility of joining NATO, the SNS paid attention to the positive aspects of coop-
eration within the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The necessity of introducing the „Slo-
vak Card” addressed to compatriots living mainly in the Czech Republic was presented 
(Košta, Greguš, 1996, p. 28).
The biggest surprise was the parliamentary entrance of the radical leftist Slovak 
Workers’ Association (ZRS). The group was founded by a former politician of the Dem-
ocratic Left Party (SDĽ) Ján Ľupták. It was a demagogic party appealing to the elector-
ate consisting of people dissatisfied with the consequences of socio-economic changes. 
The ZRS was reluctant towards the accession of Slovakia to NATO and the EU (Košta, 
Greguš, 1996, pp. 28–29). Ryszard Herbut noticed the fact that, analysing the left wing in 
Slovakia, one can distinguish two basic manifesto options: a democratic one, whose rep-
resentative is SDĽ, and the so-called populist one, identified with the Communist Party 
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of Slovakia (KSS) and the ZRS. Unlike both left-wing populist parties, SDĽ supported 
market reforms, including privatisation, but it expected that this would not happen at the 
cost of lowering the standard of living of citizens. In the economic concept of this party, 
elements of the social market economy model with strong liberal elements were visible. 
This party opted for decentralisation of the decision-making process and strengthening 
the idea of local self-government. It strongly supported accession to Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures (Herbut, 1998, p. 144). Andrzej Antoszewski classified SDĽ as the reformed post-
communist left, which accepted the principles of market economy and liberal democracy 
as a real alternative to the communist system (Antoszewski, 2005, p. 58).
Among the members of the new government there were twelve representatives of 
the HZDS, four of the ŽRS and two of the SNS. The new deputy Prime Ministers were 
Sergej Kozlík (Minister of Finance) and Katarina Tothova from HZDS, and union activ-
ist Jozef Kalman appointed by the ZRS. Juraj Schenk, a sociologist from Comenius Uni-
versity in Bratislava, took over the job of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The creation 
of the coalition was made possible due to a change in the ZRS’s position (Henderson, 
2003, p. 92).
On 20 December 1995 the Prime Minister presented a statement of policy. Focusing 
on international policy, Mečiar emphasised that the continuity of actions which aimed 
at achieving full accession to the EU and NATO would be maintained. In regard to the 
first, it was assumed that Slovakia would become a member by 2000 at the latest, and 
for this purpose the government undertook to prepare a membership application. One of 
the government’s priorities was to harmonise the legal system of the Slovak Republic 
with EU law. In the matter of international security, Mečiar stressed that the government 
would make efforts to join NATO, because membership would give Slovakia the greatest 
guarantee of security.
To this end, the government intended to intensify work under the PfP program and 
undertake actions to strengthen security in Europe, taking an active part in the work of 
the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN. The Prime Minister declared the intention 
to develop bilateral relations, first of all with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
and to create favourable conditions for the development of political and economic co-
operation. Among countries with whom cooperation was crucial, the Prime Minister 
counted the USA, Canada, Japan and Russia. He also announced the active participa-
tion of the government in the activities of international organisations dealing with the 
protection of human rights. All problems of representatives of national minorities and 
ethnic groups living on the territory of Slovakia were to be resolved in accordance with 
the provisions of the Constitution and of the applicable international agreements. Speak-
ing on behalf of the government, Mečiar stressed that he condemned manifestations of 
intolerance, chauvinism, aggressive nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. 
The implementation of the foreign policy objectives presented for the years 1994–1998, 
in the Prime Minister’s opinion, would be successful mainly thanks to the professionali-
sation of the foreign and diplomatic service, consistently enforcing the interests of the 
state. The employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were to positively distinguish 
themselves in terms of moral values and treat their work as a matter of honour and devo-
tion to their homeland. An important task for the Slovak foreign service was to support 
the state’s trade by creating conditions for the development of exports (Bajda, 2010b, 
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p. 261). Mečiar also announced that he would seek to expel members of the Democratic 
Union from the parliament, because in his opinion they failed to collect the 10,000 signa-
tures entitling them to participate in elections. Although the Main Electoral Commission 
and the Constitutional Court rejected these accusations, a special commission consisting 
of members of the HZDS, established during the extraordinary session of parliament, 
maintained these allegations and threatened sanctions. There was also anxiety in a large 
part of society. On 8 December 1994, Slovakian students organised a demonstration 
for the second time within a month with over 10,000 participants. In addition to the 
organisers, representatives of the Chancellery of President Michal Kováč, the Slovak 
Episcopate and the largest trade unions also appeared for the first time (Jagodziński, 
1994, p. 6). During this period, the conflict between the head of state and the Prime Min-
ister was escalating. When Kováč could not be forced to resign, HZDS and its coalition 
partners chose the tactics of limiting his competences. Having a majority in parliament, 
they gradually deprived the President of his powers, handing them over to the govern-
ment. The battle between the two power centres reached its culmination on 5 May 1995. 
Just after the elections, parliament set up a commission to examine the circumstances of 
the dismissal of the first government of Mečiar and the role of the Slovak Information 
Service in the events of the time. The Commission presented the results of the investiga-
tion, which were supposed to indicate that the events of March 1994 had been inspired 
by the President himself. Despite many reservations, MPs from the government coalition 
voted in favour of a vote of no confidence in the President. This was inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Constitution, which is why the chairman of the parliament declared 
that the vote had no legal consequences for the President. It was aimed at creating a so-
cial atmosphere of condemnation of the head of state. Unable to deny the President the 
right to deliver a message, on 17 May, the public television authorities postponed his 
speech to late evening (Krajčir, 1995, p. 69). These events led to clear divisions in so-
ciety. The opposition parties organised support rallies for the President. Paradoxically, 
at that time Michál Kováč, once a politician of the HZDS, became a symbol of struggle 
against Mečiar’s authoritarian system of exercising power (Slobodnik, Chmel, 1995, 
pp. 8–9). On 6 September 1995, Kováč presented the State Report in parliament and re-
ferred to foreign policy. He noted that there were no circumstances prompting a change 
in its priorities. The process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures remained one of the 
main factors determining the development of the state. The continuation of this direction 
was justified by historical and economic reasons, as well as the geopolitical location of 
Slovakia. In his opinion, strengthening the international position of the state depended 
on the arrangement of bilateral relations with neighbouring states, which was to be of 
importance for the whole of Central Europe. In this matter, the President demanded the 
further creation of a basis for the normalisation of Slovak-Hungarian relations (Pytlik, 
2010, p. 246). Mečiar’s return to the post of Prime Minister was seen as an announce-
ment of the escalation of conflicts in relations with the President. The main goal of the 
politicians of the new government coalition was to remove the President from office. 
The main obstacle to this task was the fact that the government coalition did not have 
the required qualified majority of 3/5 of votes. In this situation, the politicians of the 
coalition parties took a number of actions leading to limiting the possibilities of action 
and discrediting Kováč. To achieve the intended purpose, Mečiar did not hesitate to use 
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the special services. The actions undertaken became the reason for EU ambassadors to 
hand over to the government, on 25 October 1995, a démarche, which stressed that the 
government’s actions against the President were inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Slovak Constitution and with the political practice of the EU countries that perceived 
these events with anxiety. A protest was also submitted by the US ambassador, who 
expressed concern about the further fate of Slovak democracy (Samson, 2001, p. 371). 
On 17 November 1995, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on the need to 
respect human rights and the fate of democracy in Slovakia. The EP’s concerns pertained 
not only to the actions of some political parties seeking to dismiss the head of state, or the 
participation of special service employees in actions to discredit the President, but also 
to disregarding representatives of the opposition when filling the positions of chairmen 
of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (National Council) or the so-called Act 
on the State Language of 1995 (Zákon NR SR č. 270/1995...). The EP also called for 
discussions on the issues presented in the forum of the European Parlament and National 
Council joint committees. The answer of the Slovak government to the resolution is 
interesting. In its opinion, it was a worthless monologue, harmful to Slovakia in the pro-
cess of accession to the EU and NATO. In addition, government representatives stated 
that they regarded the resolution that had not been discussed with them to be unlawful 
(Bajda, 2010a, p. 94).
Human rights violations once again met an international reaction. In a statement is-
sued on 7 March 1996, the International Organisation of Journalists protested against 
the abuse of economic resources to block the activities of independent press in Slovakia. 
During the general meeting at the end of October, the organisation addressed the situ-
ation in the Slovak media and expressed concern about the economic pressure exerted 
on independent means of communication (Madera, 2001, p. 180). In order to combat 
political opponents, in 1996 an attempt was made to amend the penal code. The new 
code prohibits activities of parties or organisations that would harm the state’s defence 
or promote the spread of false information about the state. The President did not sign the 
amendment, fearing that the government would use the law to limit political party activi-
ties, and thus the new penal code was not implemented (Bajda, 2010a, pp. 94–95).
In addition to the scandal associated with the abduction of the President’s son, a lot of 
emotions were stirred by the murder of Robert Remiás, which involved special services 
under the leadership of Ivan Lexa. This was one of the most influential figures in the 
analysed period. After graduating in chemistry at Polytechnic, he worked at the Slovnaft 
petrochemical company. In January 1991, he became the director of Prime Minister 
Vladimír Mečiar’s office for several months. He was the first head of the chancellery of 
HZDS founded by Mečiar. After the party had won parliamentary elections in 1992, he 
was promoted to the government plenipotentiary for the organisation of the office of the 
President of Slovakia, and at the same time he was the head of the Office of the Council 
of Ministers. In the years 1993–1994, he was deputy Minister for Privatisation in the 
government of Mečiar, and then he headed the special services (SIS) until 1998. In 2000, 
he fled the country. In the summer of 2002, he was detained as an illegal immigrant in 
South Africa and deported to Slovakia (Lesná, 2008). Former SIS officer Oskar Fegy-
veres was the first to reveal that special forces had been responsible for the kidnapping 
of Kováč junior. On 29 April 1996, a car exploded with Remiáš on board. A later expert 
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opinion ruled out the initial version that the accident was caused by a gas cylinder explo-
sion; it was caused by a remotely controlled payload (Grabiński, 2002, p. 12).
During this period, the conflict between the President and the Prime Minister intensi-
fied further. On 22 May 1996, the aforementioned Ivan Lexa read a report in parliament 
in which, as enemies of the state, he named the President, opposition leaders and journal-
ists. This speech made sense in the context of the SIS Information of 26 May 1995, the 
document found after the 1998 election, which was an analysis of the steps that secret 
services could take to bring about the resignation of the head of state. One scenario sug-
gested investigating the activities of members of his family and finding materials that 
could compromise the relatives of Kováč. A second scenario was to build a constitutional 
majority to vote for the President’s impeachment. A third scenario assumed abandoning 
attacks on the President, because he could become a symbol of democracy for the society 
around which they would unite (Bajda, 2010a, p. 94). First of all, Mečiar accused the 
Chancellery of the President that they were taking actions that made it an independent 
centre of foreign policy. In fact, these allegations were addressed to the organisational 
unit dealing with the generally understood foreign policy. The lack of their validity is 
evidenced by the fact that this unit of the Presidential Office, employing several people, 
dealt primarily with the organisation of foreign travel of the head of state, foreign cor-
respondence and coordination of activities related to broadly understood foreign policy 
between the President and the government and parliament. It should be noted that every 
year the funds allocated for the activities of the Chancellery of the President were de-
creased in the budget act, which was one of the elements of conducting political struggle 
(Żarna, 1995, p. 116).
A lot of controversy arose from the case of Emil Spišák. He was to replace the late 
SNS MP Bartolomiej Kunc, but he did not take over this function as a result of internal 
fighting. He justified the deportations of the Jewish population during World War II, and 
he once became famous for claiming that national heritage had fallen into the hands of 
a small group of Jews (Avioutskii, 2007, p. 20). SNS nominated Ladislav Hruška. This 
was explained by the fact that, in the meantime, Spišak had left the party. He asked the 
Constitutional Court to investigate whether his rights had been violated. At the begin-
ning of January 1998, the Court decided that National Council had violated Spišak’s 
constitutional rights, preventing him from entering parliament. What is more, the parlia-
ment violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. According to the 
Court, National Council was obliged to abolish the adopted resolution on the entry of 
deputy Ladislav Hruška to the parliament and to give the seat to Emil Spišak. Contrary to 
the verdict, the majority coalition rejected this ruling (Madera, 2001, pp. 165–166).
An effect of the policy model pursued by Mečiar was the mobilisation of the opposi-
tion in face of the elections for the National Council proposed for 19 September 1998. 
In the autumn of 1996, the so-called Blue Coalition, composed of the centre-right par-
ties, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Union of Slovakia and the 
Democratic Party was founded. On 3 July 1997, it was extended to include two left-wing 
parties, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia and the Green Party in Slovakia, and 
this newly formed element of the Slovak political scene adopted the name of the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition (SDK). Politicians associated in its structures announced that, after 
victory in the election and the establishment of a government, they would make efforts in 
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favour of Slovakia’s return to the group of candidates for the EU and NATO. However, 
before the next parliamentary elections took place, the Prime Minister positively as-
sessed the achievements of Slovak foreign policy in 1997 (Cichosz, 2010, p. 140).
Faced with the consolidation of the opposition, Mečiar attempted to change the elec-
toral law. The bill was submitted in March 1998, only six months before the election 
date. This met with a fierce reaction from opposition politicians. The draft bill changed 
electoral constituencies by introducing one constituency. A lot of controversy arose from 
the amendment in which the Hagebach-Bishoff method of counting votes and the 5% 
electoral threshold introduced in 1992 were maintained, but this solution applied to ev-
ery political party, regardless of whether it was a part of a one-party election committee 
or an electoral coalition (Sokół, 2007, pp. 415–417).
An important aspect of the conflict between the head of state and the Prime Minis-
ter was the crisis associated with the next presidential election. The term of President 
Kováč’s office expired on 2 March 1998 and the National Council, due to the inability to 
obtain the required majority of votes, was not able to elect a new president. From March 
1998 to May 1999, according to the provisions of the Constitution, Mečiar was the head 
of state. The leader of HZDS used this situation to implement his own political plans. 
In this period, he dismissed 28 pro-opposition ambassadors and blocked proceedings 
pending in political matters, and four months before the next parliamentary elections 
introduced an amendment to the electoral law that would benefit his party. The afore-
mentioned new ordinance imposed exceptionally high demands on the coalitions which 
concentrated most opponents of the government. In this situation, the opposition evolved 
from “party coalitions” into “coalition parties” with complex structures and names (Py-
tlik, 2010, p. 249). What Mečiar gained was that for several months the leaders of the 
opposition did not have time for the election campaign.
In addition to the mobilisation of opposition parties, representatives of non-govern-
mental organisations played an important role. In October 1997, the Citizens’ Campaign 
project came into being (OK-98). In March 1998, during the congress in Zvolen, 35 Slo-
vak NGOs officially launched an initiative. The campaign focused on three basic goals: 
deepening the voters’ awareness, ensuring a high turnout and increasing the influence 
of citizens on the election process by supervising it. As part of its activity, OK-98 initi-
ated 60 educational projects that were addressed mainly at young people. According to 
Avioutskii, in 1998 380,000 voters reached electoral age, which constituted 10% of those 
entitled to vote (Avioutskii, 2007, p. 24). The activity of OK-98 was met with a fierce 
attack from the pro-government „Slovenska Republika” which suggested that the organi-
sation was financed by the USA. Two of the founders, Pavel Demeš and George Soros 
(„Slovenská Republika”...), were also attacked on its pages.
III Parliamentary election of 1998
In the electoral manifesto of 1998, HZDS politicians paid special attention to eco-
nomic relations, mainly regarding the need to attract foreign investment capital to Slova-
kia. The necessity of membership in NATO and the EU was also emphasised, but taking 
into account other arrangements and the geopolitical location of Slovakia. Nevertheless, 
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the electoral manifesto was still different from the previous practice implemented by the 
government of Mečiar. In his comments, the head of the parliamentary committee for 
European integration, Augustin M. Húska, even argued that integration posed a threat 
of globalism, cosmopolitanism and the consumerist lifestyle of the West (Wlachovský, 
1998, pp. 63–77).
Representatives of SNS strongly criticised the intention of Slovakia joining NATO 
and the EU. It was emphasised that Slovakia would lose much in EU structures, and 
NATO was blamed for conducting an aggressive military policy. The anti-NATO rheto-
ric was then particularly strong, due to the intervention in Kosovo. SNS leader Ján Slota, 
negatively oriented toward the Hungarian nation, stressed that its appearance in Europe 
was a real misfortune. There was strong criticism of the Slovak elite, who were ac-
cused of extreme cosmopolitanism. For the SNS, a pro-Russian policy was also hardly 
comprehensible, as Russia set itself visibly imperial political goals (Wlachovský, 1998, 
pp. 63–77). On 25–26 September 1998, elections to the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic were held and HZDS won again.
 
Table 2
Results of parliamentary elections in 1998
Party Result(in %)
Number 
of seats
Movement for Democratic Slovakia 27.0 43
Slovak Democratic Coalition 26.3 42
Democratic Left Party 14.7 23
The Hungarian Coalition Party 9.1 15
Slovak National Party 9.1 14
Party of the Civic Agreement 8.0 13
Communist Party of Slovakia 2.8 –
Association of Slovak Workers 1.3 –
New Slovakia 0.5 –
Slovak People’s Party 0.3 –
Hungarian People’s Movement
for Prosperity and Reconciliation
0.2 –
Independent Initiative 0.2 –
Slovak National Unity 0.1 –
Bečko – Revolutionary Workers’ Party 0.1 –
The Uniform Workers’ Party of Slovakia 0.1 –
Slovak National Alternative 0.1 –
Movement of the Third Way 0.1 –
Together 100.0 150
Source: Parlamentné voľby 1998 on Slovensko, www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/parlament-
ne-volby/1998/vysledky, 29.01.2018.
As already mentioned, the politicians put in a lot of work ahead of the election in or-
der to unite their forces and ensure that no voter’s voice of anti-Meciar views was wasted. 
An important role was played by the non-public television station Markiza, which ob-
tained a broadcasting license during Mečiar’s rule. He hoped that he would gain another 
advantage in the campaign, however it turned out otherwise. Markiza fiercely opposed 
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the Prime Minister and constituted a significant force. To some extent, the director of 
Markiza television created the figure of Mikulaš Dzurinda as the future head of the gov-
ernment (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 18). In response, a report appeared on public television in 
which politicians associated with the KDH were attacked for allegedly having exported 
works of art abroad (Maćkowiak, 1998, p. 20).
Representatives of the OSCE missions present during the 1998 elections, invited by 
the Slovakian Foreign Ministry, decided that the elections had been carried out correctly. 
However, they were forced to note that, with the exception of Markiza, other TV stations 
were not objective in their comments, not hiding their pro-government sympathies. It 
was also pointed out that one could have reservations about the composition of elec-
toral commissions which did not give opportunities to non-governmental organisations. 
Similar doubts were aroused by the electoral law itself, which could hinder Mečiar’s 
opponents from creating a government coalition. The Prime Minister himself ran the 
campaign on a really impressive scale. On 10–13 September 1998, Claudia Cardinale 
and Gerard Depardieu, and the top model Claudia Schiffer (Green, 1998), took part in 
the HZDS pre-election meeting.
Despite electoral success, Mečiar did not manage to create a government that would 
have a parliamentary majority. In this situation, this mission was entrusted to the SDK 
leader Mikulaš Dzurinda. The negotiations lasted over a month, and the fact of entering 
the coalition by the representatives of the Hungarian minority aroused a lot of emotions. 
At the very beginning of talks on the creation of a coalition, SDĽ politicians put forward 
the idea of forming a government without the participation of the Hungarians. Trying to 
discern the reasons for this objection, Rudolf Chmel claimed that the SDČ politicians 
probably were after ministerial seats, some of which would have been theirs if the Hun-
garians had not entered the government (Chmel, 1999, p. 21).
Finally, due to protests by the other coalition parties, the idea of SDĽ did not come 
into effect and representatives of the Hungarian minority entered the government. As 
Martin M. Šimečka remarks, many Slovaks realised that in the Slovak parliament, Hun-
garian deputies were the only ones who consistently voted for all acts of transformation 
and against all laws limiting democracy (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 18). The Hungarian Coali-
tion Party (SMK) itself was also hastily created after Mečiar had changed the electoral 
law. It consisted of Béla Bugar’s moderate Christian Democrats, Laslo Nagy’s liberals 
and Miklos Duray’s radical nationals. SMK in principle did not run an election campaign 
outside the regions inhabited by Hungarians. Nevertheless, young, educated Slovaks 
from large cities voted for this party (Maćkowiak, 1998, p. 20).
The coalition agreement was signed on 28 October. The government coalition was 
a peculiar phenomenon and did not have an equivalent in Europe. It was created by 
SDK, SDĽ, SMK and the Civic Alliance Party (SOP). SDK received nine ministries, 
SDL’ six, and SMK three. Mikulaš Dzurinda became the head of the government that 
was a complicated conglomeration of various factions, and of which, paradoxically, the 
main binder was Mečiar himself, should the threat of his return turned out to be real 
(Szimeczka, 1999, p. 19). Mečiar did not hide his disappointment. On 30 September, in 
a TV speech, he rebuked voters who failed to support his party and would regret their 
decision in the near future, because the new coalition would sell Slovakia to the West. 
He finished his speech with tears. He gave up his parliamentary mandate to Ivan Lexa, 
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and as a result, every request to hear the former head of the special services had to un-
dergo a complicated parliamentary procedure to lift his immunity. Mečiar, acting as the 
head of state in the first half of 1998, granted an amnesty to his close associate and all 
those involved in the abduction of the son of the president. Although Dzurinda cancelled 
the decision on amnesty, the constitutional court decided that it still remained in force 
(Grabiński, 2002, p. 12).
According to Šimečka the September election proved to be a democratic revolu-
tion, the significance of which was greater than that of November 1989. At that time, 
the events had actually echoed those in Prague, and it had soon turned out that Slovak 
society had not yet been prepared for real change. Yet in 1998, the same society demon-
strated great energy (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 21).
Conclusion
Among the countries of Central Europe, the internal situation of Slovakia had the great-
est impact on the delay of the accession process to the North Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union. While the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of 
Poland were invited to start accession negotiations during the EU summit in Luxembourg 
in 1997, the Slovak Republic was on the margins of this process. The Slovaks started 
negotiations under the provisions of the Helsinki summit in 1999, after Vladimír Mečiar 
had been removed from power. It was similar in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance; 
the three countries in question joined NATO in 1999, whereas Slovakia became a member 
a few years later. The key factor was the policy conducted in the years 1994–1998 by the 
coalition government of HZDS-SNS-ZRS under the leadership of Prime Minister Vladimír 
Mečiar. In this period there were many instances of violations of civil and political rights 
and freedoms. As a result of decisions taken by the then authorities, the opposition, both 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary, was completely marginalised. The rights of persons 
belonging to national and ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians and Roma, were also 
restricted. The opposition media also became the object of discrimination on the part of 
the rulers. The symbol of the political situation in this period was the conflict between 
Prime Minister Mečiar and the head of state. The government attempted to totally limit 
President Kováč’s prerogatives and to discredit him in the eyes of the public. The Prime 
Minister even used the special services, which kidnapped the President’s son. A number of 
actions taken in the years 1994–1998 explicitly pointed to an authoritarian way of exercis-
ing power. In none of the other countries of the Visegrad Group did such a situation occur, 
and the analogy could be traced rather in the Balkan states.
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W stronę autorytaryzmu. Sytuacja wewnętrzna w Republice Słowackiej (1994–1998) 
 
Summary
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy sytuacji wewnętrznej Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1994–1998, czyli 
okresu, w którym rządy w tym państwie sprawowała koalicja Ruchu na rzecz Demokratycznej Sło-
wacji, Słowacka Partia Narodowa i Zrzeszenie Robotników Słowackich, a funkcję premiera pełnił 
Vladimír Mečiar. Głównym celem badań była analiza działań podejmowanych przez koalicyjny rząd 
w kontekście naruszeń praw i wolności obywatelskich i politycznych, co mogło wskazywać na auto-
rytarny sposób sprawowania władzy i demontaż demokratycznego państwa prawa. W analizowanym 
okresie doszło do zmarginalizowania roli opozycji parlamentarnej i pozaparlamentarnej, ograniczenia 
roli mediów, naruszenia praw mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych, a także ostrego sporu pomiędzy 
premierem Vladimírem Mečiarem a prezydentem Michálem Kováčem. Efektem tych rządów było 
zjednoczenie niemal wszystkich sił politycznych i przejęcie władzy po wyborach w 1998 r. W celu 
odpowiedzi na pytania badawcze autor posłużył się metodą analizy instytucjonalno-prawnej, analizy 
decyzyjnej i metody statystycznej. W wyniku badań potwierdzono założoną hipotezę, że głównym 
założeniem artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że na tle innych państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: Czech, Polski 
i Węgier w przypadku Słowacji dochodziło do wielu przypadków naruszeń praw człowieka. Implikacją 
tego było drastyczne pogorszenie bilateralnych stosunków z wieloma państwami i spowolnienie proce-
su akcesji Słowacji do Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego i Unii Europejskiej.
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